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Inferential role semantics is the idea that conceptual content is determined by its role in 
reasoning: a concept C is given by the premises we use to draw C, and by the conclusions we 
draw from C. This theory entails that concepts are rich and stratified, and that conceptual 
competence involves the mastery of a wide range of inferential transitions.  
A problem shows up about the grasp of concepts. Should we conceive grasp of C as a full 
understanding and mastery of C? Should we understand grasp as an all-or-nothing problem? 
Should we be able to master all the inferential transitions determining C to grasp it? An 
affirmative answer to these questions would involve problems both for learning concepts and 
communication. 
I propose, in this context, a distinction between a common sense version of the grasp of 
concepts and an expert one. The first idea is that grasp does not entail the mastering of all the 
inferences which are constitutive of C, but just a few. Expert grasp, on the contrary, is a full 
and qualified mastery of the inferential transitions involving C. 
I present and discuss cases that support this distinction, and then try, on this basis, to shed 
light on the connection between common sense knowledge and specialist knowledge in terms 
of conceptual (inferential) matters.  
1. Inferentialism and Conceptual/Linguistic Competence 
According to inferential role semantics, concepts are determined by their inferential roles, 
the distinctive roles they play in reasoning. Such a conceptual role is identified, for the concept 
C, by the set of inferences comprehensive of the premises and conclusions where C is involved 
in the right way. A theory that directly appeals to these ideas is that of Robert Brandom 
(1994).1  
                                                          
1 Brandom provided a pragmatic account of how these inferences determine the content of speech acts within 
what he called the social practice of “giving and asking for reasons”. This game determines what the correct 
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The basic idea is based on the generalization of Gentzen’s style introduction and 
elimination rules for logical connectives to conceptual contents (and to linguistic meanings as 
well).2 The circumstances of application (both linguistic and non-linguistic) of C play the role 
of introduction rules for the concept; consequences of the application of C will play the role of 
elimination rules for the concept.3 An inferential role thus encompasses all the premises that 
infer C and all the conclusions we can draw from C. These inferences give substance to the 
wittgensteinian idea that meaning is use, and inferential role semantics is explicitly endorsed as 
our best account of use (in reasoning). Indeed, introduction and elimination rules – 
circumstances and consequences of application – play the roles of the peculiar rules of use for 
our concepts/words. 
The inferences that determine content are those that Brandom and Sellars call materially 
good.4 Their validity should not be intended just as logical (or formal), but also as material: it 
(also) depends on the non-logical concepts involved. For instance, if I infer from “whales are 
cetaceans” that “whales are mammals”, the inference is valid in virtue of the content of 
“cetacean” and “mammal” (and not just in virtue of its logical form). Thus, the inferences 
responsible for the content of our concepts are not the standard inferences of deductive logic 
(this idea is entailed by default by inferential role semantics – since concepts/meanings are 
determined by inferences, these turn out to be good on the basis of the concepts involved).5 
A particularly controversial aspect of this theory is its holistic structure. The content of a 
concept C is a function of the contents of other concepts (the inferences constitutive of C). This 
entailment appears to be troublesome, at least prima facie, since an inferentialist theorist is 
pressed to find out the specific criteria to circumscribe the scope of this conceptual holism: 
without the individuation and adoption of these criteria, semantic holism can be expanded as 
the view that the content of the concept C is determined by almost all the other concepts in the 
conceptual system CS to which C belongs (the linguistic counterpart of this point would 
involve almost an entire language L as determining the meaning of an expression E). Let us 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
inferential moves are and which beliefs are correct in the light of their consequences and of the best reasons at 
hand (from the perspective of the participants in the practice). The score-keeping activity implicit in such a 
practice determines the normative statuses of our linguistic utterances and behavior: we should distinguish 
between “commitments” and “entitlements”. This social activity is supposed to enable us to make explicit, 
through inference, the normative difference between undertaking a particular commitment and being entitled to 
something.  
2 A basic example is conjunction: given A and B, we can introduce , and then we have AB (introduction rule 
for –I); AB is the basis to infer both its conjuncts A and B by eliminating  (elimination rule for –E).  
3 See Casalegno (2004), Fodor and Lepore (2007), and Williamson (2003, 2007, 2012) for different kinds of 
criticisms of this idea. See Boghossian (2003, 2012) for a defense. 
4 See Brandom (1994: 97-105) and Sellars (1953). 
5 Material inferences also differ from standard deductive inferences because they are generally non-monotonic 
(new premises can affect the goodness of an inference). See Brandom (2000: 87-89, 2008: 106). 
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call this view SSH (strong semantic holism), which is the most radical option we can adopt to 
understand semantic holism. An inferentialist should weaken such a radical option to avoid a 
list of well-known problems, and then she must try to diminish the scope of the peculiar holism 
generated by the adoption of inferential semantics. Let us first have a look at the list.  
2. Semantic Holism: Prima Facie Problems with Grasp, Learning, and Communication 
The list of difficulties, highlighted especially by Fodor and Lepore (1992, 1993), Jackman 
(1999) and Whiting (2008), is as follows:  
(Grasp of concepts)–First of all, grasping a concept C seems to entail the complete mastery 
and understanding of all the inferences (relevant for C). But one can go too far in following the 
long chain of inferences: where does the entailment in the overall language/conceptual system 
stop? We require the mastery and the understanding of all the other concepts to grasp C. This is 
a problem, since the conditions for grasping concepts become very hard to meet. Here we need 
an explanation of the way in which such a grasp could be accommodated holistically. 
(Concept learning)–SSH also faces problems in explaining concept learning. Imagine a child 
learning her first concept C: how can it be possible to learn C if its conceptual content is 
determined by certain inferences that the child is ignoring? Our insights about learning as a 
cumulative process would be impossible to accommodate (we would in fact need to learn 
concepts before acquiring the preliminary conditions that allow us to learn them). If we want 
to preserve these insights about concept learning, then we should avoid SSH or provide a quite 
different account suitable to accommodate both semantic holism and concept learning.  
(Content sharing and stability)–SSH faces further problems when it comes to explaining our 
ability to share contents. These are usually considered the biggest worries about holism:  
1) (Constitutive instability)–The most controversial aspect of SSH is the underlying thesis of 
instability of meaning and of content of belief. Every form of SSH systematically 
generates this instability. This means that what is unacceptable in holism is that it seems 
obvious that we have different beliefs (or commitments) and, at the same time, that we share 
the same contents/meanings. SSH, in fact, entails that semantic contents vary depending on 
the beliefs of the speakers (Jackman, 1999). This means that holistic contents cannot be 
stable; rather, they must be something shifting depending on people’s beliefs.6 Therefore, 
we have reason to suppose that this instability is a feature strictly related to SSH. 
                                                          
6 See Jackman (1999: 362): “Unless two people shared all their beliefs, they wouldn’t share any of them. For 
instance, if Peter believes that elephants are afraid of mice, and Mary doesn’t, then what may have initially 
appeared to be shared beliefs – both claim ‘elephants are big animals’–would turn out to have different contents in 
virtue of the two believers meaning different things by ‘elephant’”. See also Whiting (2008) for different examples. 
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2) (Communication)–If we endorse SSH, the inferences and beliefs that we take to be 
constitutive of the concept C are often different, and this entails, not only that C can be 
slightly different for you and me but, in principle, but also that it can turn out to be 
radically different. This entailment of SSH no longer seems enough to warrant successful 
communication between speakers (there is, in fact, the possibility of meaning different 
things by using the same words). Here again, to explain communication, we would need 
to avoid SSH or to provide a theory of how it can be possible to explain communication 
holistically.7 
 
3. Grasp of Concepts. An Anti-Individualist Suggestion 
Grasp of concepts is the special problem on the list that will be the focus of this paper. At 
least in a sense, it seems to have consequences for all the other problems related to SSH. In 
fact, the peculiar holism entailed by inferentialism seems to depend strongly on the preliminary 
conception of grasp that one endorses.  
A further problem is that inferentialism lacks an official account of which inferences are 
constitutive of conceptual contents. If we cannot say which these inferences are, we find 
ourselves pressed to admit, somehow, that all are constitutive. This point is quite sloppy for 
our main theme, since content constitutiveness widely overlaps with the grasp of concepts: it is 
a prima facie reasonable view that to grasp a concept C we have to know the inferences which 
are constitutive of C. Otherwise, our grasp will be at best partial and incomplete. 
This becomes even more evident as one thinks of the grasp of concepts as an all-or-nothing 
matter: since to grasp a concept, one has to master its complete inferential role, grasp will entail 
the kind of holism that is conceptually disastrous (everything being constitutive). Thus, this 
conception of grasp (together with inferential semantics and the missing story about which 
inferences are content constitutive) seems to lead to the holism we should avoid in semantics. 
Should we understand grasp of C as a full understanding and mastering of C? Should we 
conceive grasp as an all-or-nothing problem? Should we be required to master all the inferential 
transitions determining C to grasp C? 
This line of reasoning can already be undermined by proposing a conception of grasp that 
does not commit us to these holistic entailments (but without answering the “which inferences 
determine content” question). I believe, and it seems to me that I am supported by good 
                                                          
7 Brandom developed a personal holistic account of communication and claimed that communicating would be 
better understood in terms of “cooperating in joint activity” and that it should involve “coordinating social 
perspectives by keeping deontic score [the argumentative score between discussants] according to common 
practices” (Brandom, 1994: 479). 
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evidence on this, that grasp is not (and cannot be) an all-or-nothing matter; rather, it is a matter 
of degree. It seems actually sound and coherent to distinguish between at least these two basic 
(anti-individualist)8 levels of grasp: 
 
1. “Minimum grasp”, regarding a neophyte’s possession and use of concepts, does not 
require the mastery of inferential roles, but just a few inferences. 
2. “Full grasp” is equivalent to expertise; here, the expert has a qualified mastery of the 
inferential transitions involving a concept. 
 
We should also consider a medium level of grasp, (it does not matter how vague), 
exemplified by those who are working to become experts (like graduate students). A first 
example, which is worth discussing to defend such a distinction, is the following: while it is 
strongly plausible that linguistic children are people we can talk with, we do not consider them 
experts. We presuppose in practice that grasp is a matter of degree, since there are radical cases 
where our interlocutors are not experts (in any controversial sense of “expert”). But that alone 
amounts to admitting that one can understand us without having a full grasp of the relevant 
concepts. A first moral tells us that speakers need not be experts to communicate (and to understand) 
with each other. 
A second example worthy of a little discussion is slightly different and involves the very idea 
of inferential roles. If we think about the inferential roles of many descriptive or technical 
concepts, we easily realize that we do not master all the constitutive inferences, but just a few, 
and, to know more about these, we have to ask experts (think about legal, clinical, physical, 
and biological concepts and so on and so forth).9 Thus, common sense grasp and expertise are 
different things, since we can grasp concepts without being experts; grasp, then, concerns the first 
basic judgments and inferences we learn to perform with certain words (and not the whole 
framework of implications).10 
Another feature of this suggestion is that our common sense mastery of inferential roles then 
has to be understood as minimum grasp. We should not (and actually do not) require expertise 
about anything to attribute linguistic/conceptual competence to speakers, and so minimum 
                                                          
8 See Burge (1979) for an introduction to the very idea of anti-individualism, and Putnam (1975) for the ground-
breaking idea of “division of linguistic labor”. Very roughly, the idea is that common speakers do not entirely 
master the concepts they use, and that in case of doubt and controversy, they “defer to experts” (who actually 
master the relevant concepts). See Salis (2012) for a different route relating inferentialism and anti-individualism. 
9 In the same way, someone who is not a doctor can even come to think that “arthritis” can concern one’s thigh. 
See Burge (1979).  
10 Brandom seems to explicitly endorse this kind of view, even if maybe a little bit quickly, in (2000: 64), where he 
talks about grasping concepts: “the metallurgist understands the concept tellurium better than I do, for training has 
made her master of the inferential intricacies of its employment in a way that I can only crudely approximate.” 
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grasp is enough for language users. Speakers need not be experts to be decent language users (by 
ordinary standards). This default competence is also the degree zero, the a priori condition, for 
eventually becoming an expert about certain conceptual systems/items. Think about the 
concept “copper”: we can have a common sense inferential competence about it, but then we 
can, over a further period of time, become experts about the peculiar physical properties of 
copper (and so we can become competent with regards to all the relevant specialist inferences 
involving “copper”).  
This is a coherent account about which inferences constitute common sense grasp: it is not 
an account of particular inferences, but rather a matter of statistics about the things we know 
(there are merely things that most of us know as common speakers). Vice versa, there is a set of 
specialist inferences that most of us ignore as common speakers. Far from being a brute fact 
about knowledge, this is something related to our (common, actual) practices, the relevant 
epistemic and cultural context, the effective way in which we learn language. If this is our 
conception of grasp, then the only version relevant to common speakers will be, from a semantic 
perspective, the minimal one. Grasp is minimum grasp. 
Grasp of concepts and common sense knowledge seem to be somehow intertwined by this 
view: the inferential roles mastered by the layman and those mastered by the expert reveal, in 
fact, two distinct realms of knowledge. Somehow, the criteria adopted to circumscribe minimal 
grasp of concepts are helpful in trying to spell out what common sense knowledge amounts to. 
From an inferentialist point of view, common sense knowledge appears to be a certain amount 
of information that every one of us possesses and shares as a simple speaker, as a mere user of a 
natural language. This is the generic amount of information that comes together with learning 
and using a language. This does not mean that all people have the exact same amount of 
information: there is a core of information (and indeed of inferences) that is shared by, and 
distributed throughout, a community of speakers and that is mastered in an approximate and 
flexible way. Common speakers do not equally possess the information they share (possession 
of knowledge/information, as obvious as it may be, admits degrees). 
 Another important dimension that distinguishes common sense knowledge is that it is not 
perfectly explicit and transparent to its users and owners (it is not a form of knowledge that). This 
is perfectly fine with Brandom when he says that language is a social practice where norms are 
implicit; speakers, as participants in the practice, have only implicit knowledge of the peculiar 
rules they obey when talking with each other. The explicit dimension requires meta-
vocabularies, hence theory, and this is a genuine property of expertise (though experts may 
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represent this dimension in many different ways, and not just as a set of inferences – theories 
are many). 
On the contrary, specialist knowledge amounts to a wide set of specialist inferences that are, 
in a more general and generous way, the inferences that experts are trained to master by their 
education and work (the specific epistemic profile, which is not included in common sense 
knowledge). Even for expertise, we can develop an analogue point about the possession of this 
specialist core of knowledge within a community of experts. Again, there are in fact degrees of 
knowledge (otherwise, the very assessment of scientific work would simply be impossible).11 
Finally, this kind of knowledge possesses the explicit dimension of theory by default; this 
aspect could, in principle, be developed in a further inferentialist direction. The core discursive 
practice of “giving and asking for reasons” is, in fact, the basic practice that can put simple 
speakers – trying to cope with other speakers and with reality – on the trail of the explicit 
specialist dimension: disagreement in argument and curiosity often work together in pressing 
us to improve our basic common sense knowledge and understanding of the issue(s) at stake. 
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